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Abstract 
 
In this paper we incorporate interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs 
Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences), 
and suggest a framework for analysis of mechanisms of governance of agro-ecosystem services. 
Firstly, we present a new approach for analysis and improvement of governance of agro-ecosystem 
services. It takes into account the role of specific institutional environment (formal and informal rules, 
distribution of rights, systems of enforcement); and behavioral characteristics of individual agents 
(preferences, bounded rationality, opportunism, risk aversion, trust); and transactions costs associated 
with ecosystem services and their critical factors (uncertainty, frequency, asset specificity, 
appropriability); and comparative efficiency of market, private, public and hybrid modes of 
governance. Secondly, we identify spectrum of market and private forms of governance of agro-
ecosystem services (voluntary initiatives; market trade with eco-products and services; special 
contractual arrangements; collective actions; vertical integration), and evaluate their efficiency and 
potential. Next, we identify needs for public involvement in the governance of agro-ecosystem 
services, and assess comparative efficiency of alternative modes of public interventions (assistance, 
regulations, funding, taxing, provision, partnership, property right modernization).  
Finally, we analyze structure and efficiency of governance of agro-ecosystems services in 
Zapadna Stara Planina – a mountainous region in North-West Bulgaria. Post-communist transition and 
EU integration has brought about significant changes in the state and governance of agro-ecosystems 
services. Newly evolved market, private and public governance has led to significant improvement of 
part of agro-ecosystems services introducing modern eco-standards and public support, enhancing 
environmental stewardship, desintensifying production, recovering landscape and traditional 
productions, diversifying quality, products, and services. At the same time, novel governance is 
associated with some new challenges such as unsustainable exploitation, lost biodiversity, land 
degradation, water and air contamination. What is more, implementation of EU common policies 
would have no desired impact on agro-ecosystem services unless special measures are taken to 
improve management of public programs, and extend public support to dominating small-scale and 
subsistence farms. 
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Introduction 
 
The issues of assessment and management of ecosystem services have been taking 
increasing attention in recent years (Berge and Stenseth; Boyd and Banzhaf; Daily, 1997, 
2000; Duraiappah; Farber et al.; MEA). A number of studies on specific challenges, 
institutions, and policies for agro-ecosystem services have also appeared (Antle; Gatzweiler 
et al.; OECD; VanLoon et al.; WISP). It is recognized that maintaining and improving 
ecosystem services requires an effective social order (governance) and coordinated actions at 
various levels (individual, organizational, community, regional, national, transnational). It is 
also known that effective forms of governance are rarely universal and there is a big variation 
among different ecosystems, regions, countries. Efficiency of environmental management 
depends on specific governing structures which affect in dissimilar ways individuals behavior, 
give unlike benefits, command different costs, and lead to diverse performances (Bachev, 
2007).  
Research on mechanisms of governance of agro-ecosystem services is at beginning 
stage due to “newness” of problem, little awareness, emerging novel challenges, “lack” of 
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long-term experiences, and fundamental modernization during last two decades. Most studies 
focus on certain hotspots or type ecosystem (e.g. pastoral) and individual modes (formal, 
contract, business, public). What is more, “normative” (to some ideal or external) rather than 
comparative institutional approach between feasible alternatives is employed. Likewise, 
significant social costs associated with the governance (known as transaction costs) are not 
taken into consideration. Furthermore, uni-disciplinary approach dominates, and efforts of 
economists, lawyers, ecologists, behavioral and political scientists are rarely united. Besides, 
there are little studies on specific natural, economic, institutional, international etc. factors 
responsible for variation among ecosystems, regions, countries. Consequently, understanding 
on factors of governance of ecosystem services is impeded, spectrum of feasible (informal, 
market, private, public, integral, multilateral, transnational) modes cannot be identified, and 
their efficiency, complementarities, and prospects of development assessed. All these restrict 
our capability to assist public policies, and individual, business and collective actions for 
effective supply of ecosystem services.  
In this paper we incorporate interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs 
Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political 
Sciences), and suggest framework for analysis of mechanisms of governance of agro-
ecosystem services. Firstly, we present a new approach for analysis and improvement of 
governance of agro-ecosystem services. It takes into account specific institutional 
environment; behavioral characteristics of individual agents; transactions costs associated 
with ecosystem services and their critical factors; comparative efficiency of market, private, 
public and hybrid modes of governance. Secondly, we analyze structure and efficiency of 
governance of agro-ecosystems services in Zapadna Stara Planina giving insights on state and 
challenges of agro-ecosystem services in Bulgaria. 
 
Economics of agro-ecosystem services 
 
Governance matters 
 
Humans benefit from multiple resources, products and processes supplied by natural 
ecosystems known as ecosystem services1. The amount of these services depends on natural 
evolution of ecosystems and development of human society (Figure 1). Unprecedented 
progress in science and technologies has augmented enormously human capability to benefit 
from diverse services of nature. At the same time, growing demand for natural resources and 
increased pressure on environment have been associated with immense degradation of 
ecosystems (overuse, pollution, destruction, reengineering) and reduction of related services 
(MEA). That leads to increased individuals and public concerns about the state of 
environment and enhanced actions for environmental conservation. What is more, traditional 
goals of socio-economic development have been expended incorporating environmental 
sustainability as an essential part (Raman; UN).  
 
 
 
                                                 
1  They include: provisioning services (food; water; pharmaceuticals, biochemicals, and industrial 
products; energy; genetic resources), regulating services (carbon sequestration and climate regulation;  
waste decomposition and detoxification; purification of water and air;  crop pollination;  pest and 
disease control; mitigation of floods and droughts), supporting services (soil formation; nutrient 
dispersal and cycling; seed dispersal; primary production), generation and maintenance of biodiversity, 
and cultural services (cultural, intellectual and spiritual inspiration, recreational experiences,  
scientific discovery) (Daily, 1997; MEA). 
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Figure 1: Governing mechanisms for ecosystem services 
 
. 
 
 
Achieving sustainable development and assuring effective supply of ecosystem services 
require appropriate behavior of individuals 2  and coordinated actions at local, regional, 
national, transnational and global levels (Bachev, 2009). According to (awareness, symmetry, 
strength, harmonization costs of) interests of agents associated with ecosystem services 
(consumers, contributors, transmitters, interest groups) there are different needs for governing 
of actions. Various governance needs for effective supply of agro-ecosystem services are 
presented in Figure 2. Farms 1 has to govern its efforts and relations with Farm 2 since both 
receive services from Ecosystem 1 and affect (positively or negatively) service supply of that 
ecosystem. Besides, both farms are to govern their relations with consumers of services from 
Ecosystem 1 (agents in Social system 1) to meet total demand and compensate costs for 
maintaining ecosystem services to that direction. In addition, Farms 1 and 2 have to 
coordinate efforts with agents in Social system 1 to mitigate conflicts with agents in Social 
                                                 
2 “pro-environmental” actions, “anti-environmental” inactions. 
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system 2 (affecting negatively services of Ecosystem 1). Furthermore, Farm 1 is to govern its 
relations with Farm 3 for effective service supply from Ecosystem 3, and manage its 
interaction with Ecosystem 2. Moreover, Farms 1 and 3 have to govern their relations with 
Farms 4 and agents from Social system 1 (consumers of services of Ecosystem 3) and Social 
system 2 (consumers and destructors of Ecosystem 3 services). Finally, Farm 1 affecting 
adversely Ecosystem 4 services is to govern relations with agents in Social system 2 
(consumers of Ecosystem 4 services) to reconcile conflicts and secure effective flow of 
ecosystem services. Therefore, Farm 1 is to be involved in seven different systems of 
governance in order to assure effective supply of services from ecosystems of which it 
belongs or affects. Similarly, for effective governance of Ecosystem 1 services there are 
necessary five governing modes – for coordination of actions of Farms 1 and 2; agents in 
Social system 1; Farms 1 and 2 with Social system 1; agents in Social system 2; Farms 1 and 
2 and Social system 1 with Social system 2. 
 
Figure 2: Governance needs for effective supply of agro-ecosystem services  
 
 
Individuals can govern their relations by free market (adapting to market prices 
movements), contracting (negotiating a “private order”), coalition (collective decision-
making, cooperation), within internal organization (“hand of manager”), by public mode or 
hybrid organization. “Rational” agents tend to select or design the most effective form for 
governing of their relations maximizing benefits and minimizing costs of transactions 
(Williamson). In some cases, choice of governance is imposed by dominating institutional 
environment3. For instance, market and private mode could be illegitimate for certain natural 
resources (e.g. managing national parks and reserves). Mode of governance also depends on 
personal characteristics of agents – individuals preferences, ideology, ethical and religious 
                                                 
3 Institutions (“rules of the game”) determine individuals’ rights and obligations, and way(s) they are 
enforced (North). They are constituted by formal laws, regulations, international agreements as well as 
tradition, culture, religion, ideology, ethical and moral norms (informal rules). Enforcement of rights is 
done by state, community or international pressure, trust, reputation, private modes, self-enforcement. 
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believes, bounded rationality4, training, managerial skills, risk aversion, trust, tendency for 
opportunism. 5  For example, there are increasing number of voluntary and cooperative 
initiatives of producers and consumers (“codes of eco-behavior”, “sustainability movements”, 
“green alliances”) being an important part of eco-governance.  
Problem of effective management of environmental resources is important part of 
economic theory. Most often it is discussed in relation to (in)efficiency of using common 
natural resources (“tragedy of commons”) (Hardin), and “negative externalities” of some 
activities (Pigou). When common ownership and “open access” to natural resources exists, 
there is tendency for inefficient use (“overuse”) of resources. For example, there are certain 
natural limits for “sustainable” exploitation of a meadow for livestock farming and long-term 
efficiency (output) would decrease if number of grazing animals increase beyond these norms 
of effective reproduction. In one-person farm or private ownership, there will be no conflict 
between efficiency and sustainability (maximization of output over time). However, in 
situation of multiple users and open access, there are strong individual interests for overusing 
common resources since private costs are not proportionate to private benefits.6 Consequently, 
constant overuse (non-sustainability) and low long-term efficiency come out as result of this 
form of organization of natural resources. Nonetheless, “tragedy of commons” could be 
avoided by alternative mode of governance. For instance, introduction of public regulation on 
exploitation of natural resources, such as distribution (enforcement) of quotas for farmers 
would keep sustainability. In other instances, privatization of natural resources would be 
effective solution since it would create strong private incentives (mechanisms) for 
preservation of resources7.   
Typical case for “market failure” in effective allocation and sustainable use of natural 
resource is caused by negative (positive) externalities of certain activities. Free-market prices 
do not always reflect impact on third party’s welfare, and cannot govern effectively resource 
allocation (uses). For instance, price of livestock products does not comprise costs of 
pollution of underground water by farm activity. Since private agents (farmers, consumers) do 
not pay full price and costs associated with their activity, they are not interested in most 
effective (sustainable) use of natural resources. Maximization of social output (welfare) is not 
achieved, and inefficient allocation and overuse of resources, and unsustainable development 
come as a result. Hence farmers will over-produce “public bads” (noise, air, water pollution) 
and under-produce “public goods” (rural amenities, ecological and cultural services; 
biodiversity). Therefore, public intervention for elimination of differences between “social” 
and “private” prices (“internalization of externalities”) through taxes, norms etc. is suggested.  
Coase proved that problem of “social costs” does not exist in world of zero transaction 
costs8 and well-defined private rights (Coase). Situation of maximum efficiency is always 
achieved independent of initial allocation of rights. If for instance, farmer has “right to 
                                                 
4 Agents do not possess full information about system (price ranges, trade opportunities, adverse 
effects of their activities on others, trends in development) since collection and processing such 
information is very expensive or impossible (future events, partners intention for cheating, time and 
space discrepancy between actions and adverse impacts).  
5 Individuals are given to opportunism and if there is opportunity to get non-punishably extra rent from 
exchange (performing unwanted exchange) they will likely “steal” others rights (Williamson). 
6 Individuals get full output from increasing number of animals while bear small portion of overall 
decrease in total yield as result of over-exploitation. 
7 Private agent (owner) will contract and control effective and sustainable use of limited natural 
resources. 
8 Transaction costs are costs for governing relations between individuals – “costs associated with 
protection and exchange of individuals’ rights” (Furuboth and Richter). They have two behavioral 
origins – individuals bounded rationality and tendency of opportunism (Williamson). 
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pollute”, affected agents would pay him appropriate “bribe”9 to stop polluting activity. If 
farmer does not possess “right to pollute”, then he would compensate other agents to let him 
certain pollution. In either case, welfare of all agents is maximized and maximum efficiency 
(“Pareto optimum”) reached without any need for public intervention. In situation of minor 
transaction costs the mode of governance would not be of economic importance (Williamson). 
Individuals could coordinate and stimulate environmental conservation and consumption 
activity with equal efficiency though free market, or through private organizations of different 
types, or in a single nationwide hierarchy. All information for effective exploitation of natural 
and technological opportunities and satisfying various demands would be costlessly available. 
Individuals would easily coordinate activity and exchange rights in mutual benefit until 
exhausting possibilities for maximizing welfare (productivity, consumption, supply of 
ecosystem services10).  
When transaction costs are significant then costless negotiation, exchange and 
protection of individuals rights is not possible. Therefore, initial allocation of property rights 
between individuals (groups) and their good assignment and enforcement are critical for 
overall efficiency and sustainability. For instance, if “rights on sustainable environment” are 
not well-defined that creates big difficulties in effective ecosystem service supply – costly 
disputes between polluting and affected agents; disregards of interests of certain groups or 
generations etc.  
In specific natural, economic and institutional environment individuals develop and use 
diverse effective (market, private, hybrid) modes to govern their relations (Figure 1). However, 
individual modes have unequal efficiency for supplying ecosystem services since they posses 
unlike potential to decrease bounded rationality, induce individual and collective efforts, 
safeguard investment, protect and dispute rights, facilitate exchange, coordinate actions, save 
transacting costs, adapt to changing natural and institutional environment (Bachev, 2007). 
Often, imperfect institutional environment and high costs of market and private governance 
block otherwise effective for all sides (socially desirable) eco-activity. There is a need for 
third-party public intervention (assistance, regulation, arbitration) in individuals transactions 
to make them more efficient or possible. Nonetheless, public involvement is not always 
effective (delayed, under-, over-intervention) and as result agrarian “development” is 
substantially deformed. When market and private sector “fail”, and effective public 
intervention is not put in place, environment conservation and improvement activities would 
not be carried at (socially) effective scale, and supply of ecosystem services diminished 
bellow practically possible level. In Bulgaria for instance, there has been numerous 
“government failures” during post-communist transition now. Consequently, ineffective 
farming organization with significant environmental problems sustain in agriculture11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 equal to lost income or welfare. 
10  There is principle agreement (”social contract”) for global sustainable development. Specific 
individuals and public demand (value) of ecosystem services depend on state of economic 
development, endowments with natural resources, awareness of environmental challenges, dominating 
institutions in different communities, regions and countries.  
11 Ineffective farming structures, degradation of farmland, pollution of surface and ground waters, loss 
of biodiversity, significant greenhouse gas emissions, are typical (Bachev, 2008). 
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Choice of governing mode 
 
In rare cases there is only one practically possible form for governance of ecosystem 
service activity 12 . Generally there is great variety of alterative modes for governing of 
environmental activity. For instance, supply of environmental conservation service could be 
governed as: voluntary activity of farmer; though private contracts of farmer with interested 
(affected) agents; though interlinked contract between farmer and supplier (processor); though 
cooperation (collective action) with other farmers and stakeholders; though (free)market or 
assisted by third-party (certifying, controlling agent) trade with special (eco, protected origin, 
fair-trade) products; though public contract specifying farmer’s obligations and compensation; 
though public order (regulation, taxation, quota); within hierarchical public agency or hybrid 
form. 
Individual governing forms have distinct advantages and disadvantages to protect 
rights, and coordinate and stimulate socially desirable activities. Free market has big 
coordination and incentive features (“invisible hand of market”13, “power of competition”), 
and provides “unlimited” opportunities to benefit from specialization and exchange. 
However, market governance could be associated with high uncertainty, risk, and costs due to 
lack of information, price instability, great possibility for facing opportunism, “missing 
market” situation. Special contract form permits better coordination, intensification, and 
safeguard transactions. However, it may require large costs for specifying provisions, 
adjustments with changes in conditions, enforcement and disputing of negotiated terms. 
Internal (ownership) organization allows greater flexibility and control on transactions (direct 
coordination, adaptation, enforcement, dispute resolution by fiat). However, extension of 
internal mode beyond family and small-partnership boundaries14 may command significant 
costs for making coalition (finding partners, design, registration, restructuring), and current 
management (coordination, decision-making, control of coalition members opportunism). 
Separation of ownership from management (cooperative, corporation) gives enormous 
opportunities for growth in productivity and transacting efficiency – internal division and 
specialization of labor; exploration of economies of scale/scope; introduction of innovation; 
diversification; risk sharing; investing in product promotion, brand names, relations with 
customers, counterparts and authorities). However, it could be connected with huge 
transaction costs for decreasing information asymmetry between management and 
shareholders, decision-making, controlling opportunism, adaptation. Cooperative and non-for 
profit form also suffers from low capability for internal long-term investment due to non-for 
profit goals and non-tradable character of shares (“horizon problem”). 
Efficiency of governance also depends on “critical dimensions” of transactions – 
factors responsible for variation of transaction costs15 . When recurrence of transactions 
between same partners is high, then both (all) sides are interested in sustaining and 
minimizing costs of relations (avoiding opportunism, building reputation, setting up 
adjustment mechanisms). Besides, costs for developing special private mode for facilitating 
bilateral (multilateral) exchange could be effectively recovered by frequent transactions. 
When (environmental, behavioral, institutional) uncertainty surrounding transactions 
                                                 
12 In Japanese dispersed paddy agriculture water supply could not have been conducted by individual 
farmers (interdependency, nonseparability of water use) and since earliest period water use 
organization developed as public projects (Mori). 
13 Some ecosystem services are directly priced on market or included in related resource (product) 
prices – soil quality, access to clean water, land location (beauty), special origin (quality) of products. 
14 allowing resource concentration for effective operations (exploration economies of scale/scope). 
15  “Frequency”, “uncertainty”, and “asset specificity” were identified by Williamson while 
“appropriability” added by Bachev and Labonne.  
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increases then costs for securing transactions are high – for overcoming information 
deficiency, safeguarding against risk etc. While certain risks could be diminished by 
particular market mode (purchase of insurance) governance of most transacting risk16 requires 
special private (collective) form - contract, cooperation, integration.  
Transaction costs get very high when specific assets for relations with a particular 
partner are to be deployed. Relation specific investments are "locked" in transactions with 
particular buyer (seller), and cannot be recovered through "faceless" market trade or 
redeployment to another uses. Therefore, dependant investment have to be safeguarded by 
special form such as long-term contract, interlinks, hostage taking, joint investment, 
ownership integration. Nevertheless, when symmetrical (capacity, site, origin, branding, time 
of delivery) inter-dependency of investments or welfare of agents exist, then costs of 
governance are not significant (mutual interests for cooperation).  
Transacting is particularly difficult when appropriability of rights (on products, 
services, resources) is low.  In this case, possibility for unwanted (market, private) exchange 
is great, and costs for protection (safeguard, detection of cheating, disputing) of private rights 
extremely high. Agents would either over-produce (negative externalities) or under-organize 
such activity (positive externalities) unless they are governed by efficient private or hybrid 
mode (cooperation, strategic alliances, long-term contract, trade secrets, public order). 
Thus, we have to put individual transaction(s) in center of analysis, and assess  
comparative efficiency of practically possible forms for governance of that transaction(s)17. 
Discrete structural analysis is suggested which “align transactions (differing in attributes) 
with governance structures (differing in costs and competence) in discriminating (transaction 
cost economizing) way” (Williamson). According to combination of specific characteristics of 
each transaction, there will be different most effective form for governing of ecosystem 
service activity (Figure 3). Transactions with good appropriability, high certainty, and 
universal character of investments could be effectively carried across free market through 
spotlight or classical contracts 18 . There are widespread market modes for selling pure 
“ecosystem services” (eco-visits, hunting, fishing, harvesting wild plants, animals) or 
“ecosystem services” interlinked with other products and services (organic, fair-trade, special 
origins, on-farm sale, self-pick, education, eco-tourism, horse-riding, eco-restaurants). 
Recurrent transactions with low specificity, high uncertainty and appropriability, could 
be effectively governed through special contract. Relational contract is applied when detailed 
terms of transacting are not known at outset (high uncertainty), and framework (mutual 
expectations) rather than specification of obligations is practiced19. Special contract forms is 
also efficient for rare transactions with low uncertainty, high specificity and appropriability. 
Here dependent investment could be successfully safeguarded through contract provisions 
since it is easy to define and enforce relevant obligations of partners in all possible 
contingencies (no uncertainty). For example, eco-contracts and cooperative agreements 
between farmers and interested businesses 20  or communities are widely used including 
payment for ecosystem services, and lead to production methods (enhanced pasture 
management, reduce use of agrochemicals, wetland preservation) protecting water from 
pollution, mitigating floods and wild fires.  
                                                 
16 risk of market, behavioral or institutional uncertainty. 
17 There are effective modes for integral organization of different type transactions but there is no 
universal form for effective organization of all transactions. 
18  Partner can be changed anytime without significant additional costs (no dependency). Private 
governance would only bring costs without producing any benefits. 
19 No big risk is involved since investments could be easily/costlessly redeployed to another use(users). 
20 e.g. drinking water companies in Germany (Hagedorn), and mineral water company Vittel in France 
(Hanson et al.). We discovered such agreements between farmers and Sony, Kumamoto region, Japan.  
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            Figure 3: Principle modes for governing of ecosystem service transactions 
Critical dimensions of transactions 
Appropriability 
                                  High Low 
Assets Specificity 
          Low           High 
Uncertainty 
       Low       High       Low       High 
Frequency 
 
 
 
Generic modes 
High  Low High   Low  High   Low  High   Low 
 
Free market h h    
Special contract form  h h    
Internal organization  h h   
Third-party involvement  K  K  
Public intervention    K 
  h - the most effective mode; K - a necessity for a third party involvement 
 
Transactions with high frequency, big uncertainty, great assets specificity, and high 
appropriability, have to be governed within internal organization. Very often effective scale 
of specific investment in agro-ecosystem services exceeds borders of traditional agrarian 
organizations. If specific capital (knowledge, technology, equipment, funding) cannot be 
effectively organized within singe organization21, then effective external form(s) is to be used 
– joint ownership, interlinks, cooperative, lobbying for public intervention. For instance, 
environmental cooperatives are very successful in some EU countries (Hagedorn). 
Nevertheless, costs for initiation and maintaining collective organization for overcoming 
unilateral dependency are usually great (big number of coalition, different interests of 
members, opportunism of “free-riding” type) and it is unsustainable or does not evolve at all22.  
Serious problems also arise when condition of assets specificity is combined with high 
uncertainty, low frequency, and good appropriability of transactions. Here governance of 
transacting risk would require special private forms – direct marketing, distribution channels, 
providing guarantees, investing in labels, share-rent (output-based) compensation, employing 
economic hostages, participating in risk-pooling cooperative, complete integration. However, 
elaboration of special governance for private (occasional) transacting is not always justified, 
specific investments not made and activity fails to occur at effective scale. In these cases, a 
third part (private, public) involvement in transactions is necessary (assistance, arbitration, 
regulation) to make them more efficient or possible. Unprecedented development of special 
origins23, organic farming and system of fair-trade are good examples in that respect. There is 
increasing consumer’s demand (price premium) for organic, original, and fair-trade products 
in developed countries. Nevertheless, their supply could not be met unless effective trilateral 
governance (including independent certification and control) is put in place. 
                                                 
21 coalition made, minimum scale of operations reached, economy of scale/scope explored. 
22 Individual benefits are not proportional to individual efforts, and everybody tends to expect others 
to invest costs for organizational development and later on benefit ("free riding") from new 
organization (Olson).  
23 EU “Protected Designation of Origin”, “Protected Geographical Indication”, “Traditional Specialty 
Guaranteed”. 
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Governing transactions is extremely difficult when appropriability is low. Respecting 
others rights or granting out additional rights could be governed by “good will” or charity 
actions. Many voluntary initiatives have emerged driven by preferences for eco-production, 
competition in industries, responds to public pressure for sound environmental management. 
However, environmental standards are usually “process-based”, and “environmental audit” is 
not conducted by independent party, which does not guarantee performance outcome24 . 
Besides, voluntary (charity) initiatives could hardly satisfy entire social demand especially 
when require considerable costs. Some private modes could be employed if high frequency 
(investment pay-back possible) and mutual dependency (incentive to cooperate) exists. In 
these instances, unwritten accords, interlinking, bilateral (collective) agreements, close-
membership cooperatives, codes of professional behavior, alliances, internal integration are 
used.  
Governance of most ecosystem services requires large organizations with diversified 
interests of agents (providers, consumers, destructors, interest groups). Emergence of special 
large-members organizations for dealing with low appropriability is slow and expensive, and 
they are not sustainable in long run (“free riding”). Therefore, there is a strong need for a 
third-party public (Government, local authority, international assistance) intervention to make 
such eco-activity possible or more effective. For example, supply of “environmental goods” 
by farmers could hardly be governed through private contracts with individual consumers 
because of low appropriability, high uncertainty, and rare character of transacting25. At the 
same time, supply of environmental service is very costly and unlikely be carried on 
voluntary basis. Besides, financial compensation of farmers by willing consumers through 
pure market mode (fee, price premium) is also ineffective due to high information asymmetry, 
massive enforcement costs. Third-party mode with direct public involvement would make 
that transaction effective: on behalf of consumers State agency negotiates with farmers 
contract for “environment conservation and improvement service”, coordinates activities of 
various agents, provides public payments for farmers compensation, controls implementation 
of negotiated terms26.  
 
Effective modes for public intervention 
 
Analysis and improvement of public governance of agro-ecosystems services have to 
include following steps (Figure 4): 
Firstly, we have to identify trends, factors and risks associated services of various agro-
ecosystems. Modern science offers precise methods to classify diverse agro-ecosystem 
services (their spatial and temporal scales), evaluate trends and risks in their evolution, and 
identify driving ecological and social factors for their progression (MEA). What is more, it 
suggests effective methods to improve farming, business and consumption practices in order 
to mitigate environmental and social hazards on ecosystem services.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Huge food safety, animal safety, and eco-scandals demonstrates that private schemes could often fail 
(high information asymmetry, possibility for opportunism). 
25 high costs for negotiating, contracting, charging all potential consumers, disputing. 
26 Public environmental contracts with farmers are broadly used in EU as effective form for governing 
supply of environmental preservation and improvement services (EC). 
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Figure 4: Steps in improvement of public governance of agro-ecosystem services  
 
 
 
 
Secondly, we have to access efficiency and potential of existing mechanisms of 
governance (institutions, market, private, public) to deal with problems and risks for 
sustainable flow of agro-ecosystem services. It will be based on analysis of structure and 
dynamics of (individuals, groups, public) interests in each agro-ecosystem and transaction 
costs for their communication, protection and reconciliation.  
Third, we have to identify deficiencies (failures) in dominating market, private, and 
public 27  modes to govern effectively behavior of agents associated with agro-ecosystem 
services (consumers, contributors, transmitters, interest groups, authorities). Existing and 
emerging transacting difficulties are to be specified - undefined or badly defined and enforced 
private rights, bounded rationality and opportunisms of agents; low appropriability and 
frequency, and high dependency and uncertainty of transactions. That help define needs and 
types for new public interventions in agro-ecosystem services. 
Finally, we have to identify alternative modes for new public intervention able to 
correct market, private and public failures; assess their comparative efficiency, and select 
most efficient one(s). It is essential to compare practically (technically, socially) possible 
forms of governance which correspond to social preferences for benefits28, instruments, and 
costs. Comparative efficiency is to be evaluated in terms of coordination, incentive, conflict 
resolution and (transaction) costs minimization potential. Public modes not only facilitate 
(market, private) transactions but also command significant (public and private) costs. That is 
why assessment is to comprise all implementation and transaction costs – direct (tax payer, 
assistance agency) expenses, and transacting costs (for coordination, stimulation, information, 
control of opportunism, mismanagement) of bureaucracy, and costs for individuals’ 
participation in public modes (adaptation, information, paper works, fees, bribes), and costs 
for community control over and reorganization (modernization, liquidation) of public forms, 
and (opportunity) “costs” of public inaction 29.  
                                                 
27 Major reason for reforming EU CAP was “undesired” effects as over-intensification, environmental 
degradation, market distortions. 
28 Behavior to be changed; conflict to be mitigated; risks to be overcome; extend of restoration, 
preservation, augmentation of agro-ecosystem services. 
29 Value of some lost agro-ecosystem services could be expressed in economic terms – income decline 
in related industries, substitution or recovery costs, adverse impacts on human welfare. However, 
Identification of trends, factors and risks of various agro-ecosystem services  
 
Assessing efficiency and potential of existing modes of governance  
 
Identifying needs for public intervention 
Assessing comparative efficiency of feasible modes for 
public intervention and selecting best one(s) 
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Depending on uncertainty, frequency, and necessity for specific investment of public 
involvement, there will be different most effective forms (Figure 5). Interventions with low 
uncertainty and assets specificity would require smaller public organization (more regulatory 
modes; improvement of laws, contract enforcement). When uncertainty and assets specificity 
of transactions increases a special contract mode would be necessary – public contracts for 
provision of private services, public funding (subsidies) of private activities, temporary labor 
contract for carrying public programs, leasing out public assets for private management. 
When transactions are with high assets specificity, uncertainty and frequency then internal 
mode and bigger public organization would be needed – permanent public employment 
contracts, in-house integration of crucial assets in specialized public agency (company).  
 
Figure 5: Effective modes for public intervention in agro-ecosystem services supply  
Level of Uncertainty, Frequency, and Assets specificity 
Low                                                  ←-----------------------------------→                                   High 
New property 
rights 
Regulations Taxes Assistance and 
support 
Public 
provision 
Rights for clean, 
beautiful 
environment, 
biodiversity; 
Private rights on 
natural, biological, 
and environmental 
resources;  
Private rights for 
(non) profit 
management of 
natural resources;  
Tradable quotas 
(permits) for 
polluting;  
Private rights on 
intellectual 
property, origins, 
(protecting) 
ecosystem 
services; 
Rights to issue 
eco-bonds, shares; 
Private liability 
for polluting 
Regulations for organic farming; 
Regulations for trading of protection of 
ecosystem services; 
Quotas for emissions and use of 
products, resources; 
Regulations for introduction of foreign 
species, GM crops; 
Bans for certain activity, use of inputs, 
technologies; 
Norms for nutrition and pest 
management; 
Regulations for water protection 
against nitrates pollution; 
Regulations for biodiversity, landscape 
management;  
Licensing for water or agro-system use; 
Quality, food safely standards; 
Standards for good farming practices; 
Mandatory eco-training; 
Certifications, licensing; 
Compulsory eco-labeling; 
Designating environmental vulnerable, 
reserve zones; 
Set-aside measures; 
Inspections, fines, ceasing activities 
Tax 
rebates, 
exception, 
breaks; 
Eco-
taxation 
on 
emissions, 
products; 
Levies on 
manure 
surplus; 
Levies on 
farming or 
export for 
innovation 
funding;   
Waste tax 
Recommendation, 
information, 
demonstration; 
Direct payments, 
grants for eco-actions 
of farms, businesses, 
communities; 
Preferential credit; 
Public eco-contracts; 
Government 
purchases (water, 
other limited 
resources); 
Price, farm support 
for organic 
production, special 
origins; 
Funding eco-training; 
Assistance in farm, 
eco-associations; 
Collecting fees for 
paying ecosystem 
service contributors 
Research,   
extension; 
Market 
information; 
Agro-
meteorological 
forecasts; 
Sanitary and 
veterinary 
control, 
vaccination, 
prevention 
measures; 
Public agency 
(company) for 
important 
ecosystems; 
Pertaining 
“precaution 
principle”;  
Eco-
monitoring; 
Eco-foresight; 
Risk 
assessment 
 
Initially, it is to be considered ways to fix market and private failure by creating 
environment for decreasing uncertainty surrounding (market, private) transactions, increasing 
intensity of private exchange, protecting private rights (investments), making private 
investments less dependent (Figure 3). For instance, State establishes (enforces) quality, 
safety and environmental standards, certifies producers and users of natural resources, 
regulates exploitation of eco-resources, transfers water management rights to farms 
associations, and that facilitates (market and private) transactions of agro-ecosystem services.   
Likewise, low appropriability is often caused by unspecified or badly specified private 
rights. In this cases, most effective government intervention would be to introduce and 
                                                                                                                                                        
significant social value can hardly be expressed in monetary terms – adverse impact on biodiversity, 
other ecosystems, human health, future generations. 
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enforce new private property rights – rights on natural, biological, and environmental 
resources; on issuing environmental bonds and shares; marketing and stock trading of 
ecosystem services protection; tradable quotas for polluting; private rights on intellectual 
agrarian property, origins. That would be appropriate when privatization of resources or 
introduction (enforcement) of new rights is not associated with significant costs (low 
uncertainty, recurrence, and specificity of investment). That public intervention effectively 
transfers transactions into market and private governance, liberalizes market competition and 
induces private incentives (investments) in eco-activities. For instance, tradable permits 
(quotas) are used to control overall use of resources or level of particular pollution30. They 
give flexibility allowing farmers to trade permits and meet own requirements according to 
their adjustment costs and specific conditions. That form is efficient when particular target 
must be met, and progressive reduction is dictated through permits while trading allows 
compliance to be achieved at least costs (private governance). The later let also market for 
environmental quality to develop31.  
In other instances, it would be efficient to put in place regulations for trade and 
utilization of resources, products and services – standards for product quality, eco-
performance, animal welfare; norms for using natural resources, introduction of foreign 
species and GM crops, and (water, soil, air, comfort) contamination; bans on application of 
certain chemicals and technologies; regulations for trading ecosystem service protection32; 
foreign trade regimes; mandatory eco-training and licensing of farm operators. Large body of 
environmental regulations in developed countries aim changing farmers behavior and 
restricting negative externalities33. It makes producers responsible for environmental effects 
of their activity or management of products uses (e.g.waste). This mode is effective when 
general improvement of performance is desired but it is not possible to dictate what changes 
(in activities, technologies) is appropriate for wide range of operators and eco-conditions 
(high uncertainty, information asymmetry). When level of hazard is high, outcome is certain 
and control is easy, and no flexibility exists (for timing or nature of socially required result), 
then bans or strict limits are best solution. However, regulations impose uniform standards for 
all regardless of compliance (adjustment) costs and give no incentives to over-perform 
beyond certain level.  
Sometimes, using incentives and restrictions of tax system would be effective form for 
intervention. Different tax preferences (exception, breaks, credits) are widely used to create 
favorable conditions for development of certain sub-sectors, regions, activities, forms of 
organizations, segment of population. Environmental taxation on emissions or products 
(inputs, outputs) is also applied to reduce use or leakage of harmful substances34. Eco-taxes 
impose same conditions for all farmers using particular input and give signals to take into 
                                                 
30 E.g. manure production quotas (Holland), water abstraction licenses and water rights trading (UK, 
Australia), nutrition trading schemes (some US river catchments). 
31 Permits can be taken out of market to raise environmental quality above publicly “planned” level. 
32 One can acquire credits for sponsoring protection of carbon sequestration sources or restoration of 
ecosystem service providers. Banks for handling such credits are established and conservation 
companies even gone public on stock exchanges (Daily et al.). 
33 In EU there are bans for spraying pesticides by airplane, burning after harvest, overhead irrigation of 
grassland; detailed regulations for nutrition and pest management, water protection against pollution 
by nitrates, biodiversity and landscape management; licensing for water use. Each country develops 
“good farming practices“ system setting specific codes for sustainable farming. 
34 Taxes on manufacturing or trade of pesticides and fertilizer are used (Scandinavian countries, 
Austria) to decrease their application and environmental impact. Dutch levies on manure surplus 
(based on levies for nitrogen and phosphorus surpluses) create incentives to minimize leakages and not 
substitute taxable for non-taxable inputs. 
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account “environmental costs” inflicted on rest of society. Taxing is effective when there is 
close link between activity and environmental impact, and when there is no immediate need 
to control pollution or meet targets for reduction. Tax revenue is also perceived to be 
important to maintain budget (activities) of special environmental programs. However, 
appropriate level of charge is required to stimulate desirable change in farmers behavior35. 
Furthermore, nitrogen emission can vary according to conditions when nitrates are applied 
and attempting to reflect this in tax may result in complexity and high (administrative and 
private) costs36.  
In some cases, public assistance and support to private organizations is best mode. 
Large agrarian (rural) development, environment conservation, and trans-border cooperation 
programs are widely used in industrialized countries. Public financial support for eco-actions 
is most commonly used instrument for improving environment performance of farmers. It is 
easy to justify public payments as compensation for provision of “environmental service”. All 
studies shows that value placed upon landscape exceed greatly costs of running schemes. 
However, share of farms and land covered by various agri-environmental support measures is 
not significant37. That is a result of voluntary (self-selection) character of this mode not 
attracting farmers with highest environment enhancement costs (intensive, damaging 
environment producers). In other cases, low-rate of farmers’ compliance with eco-contracts is 
serious problem38. Later cannot be solved by augmented administrative control (enormous 
enforcement costs) or introducing bigger penalty (politically, juridical intolerable). 
Disadvantage of “payment system” is that once introduced it is practically difficult 
(“politically unacceptable”) to be stopped when goals are achieved or there are funding 
difficulties. Moreover, withdraw of subsidies may lead to further environmental harm since it 
would induce adverse actions (intensification, return to conventional farming). Main critics of 
subsidies are associated with their “distortion effect”, negative impact on “entry-exit 
decisions” from polluting industry, unfair advantages to certain sectors in country or 
industries in other countries. It is estimated that agri-environmental payments are efficient in 
maintaining current level of environmental capital but less successful in enhancing 
environmental quality (EC). 
Often providing public information, recommendations, training and education to 
farmers, rural population, and consumers are most efficient form. In some cases, pure public 
organization (in-house production, public provision) will be effective as in case of important 
agro-ecosystems 39  and national parks; agrarian research, education and extension; agro-
meteorological forecasts; sanitary and veterinary control.  
Usually, individual modes are effective if they are applied alone with other modes of 
public intervention. Necessity of combined intervention (governance mix) is caused by: 
complementarities (joint effect) of different forms; restricted potential of some less expensive 
forms to achieve certain (but not entire) level of socially preferred outcome; possibility to get 
extra benefits (e.g.“cross-compliance” requirement for receiving public support); particularity 
of problems to be tackled; specific critical dimensions of governed activity; uncertainty (little 
knowledge, experience) associated with likely impact of new forms; Government 
                                                 
35 In Scandinavia introduction of such tax brought reduced pesticide use while doubling tax rate in 
California had no discernable effect on sales (ECOTEC). 
36 Dutch annual tax revenue was 7,3 millions Euro against administration costs 24,2 millions and 
compliance expenses 220-580 per farms (ECOTEC). 
37 It is 25% of Utilized Agricultural Area (UAA) in old EU members (EC). 
38 In France 40% of farmers face some difficulties to enforce contracts in their parts of eco-impact 
(Dupraz et al.).  
39  In Japan special (“third sector”) public organizations at local level take care of farmland in 
unpopulated regions. 
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(administrative, financial) capability to fund, control, and implement different modes; 
dominating policy doctrine (Bachev, 2007).  
Besides, level of effective public intervention (governance) depends on the scale of 
ecosystem and kind of the problem. There are public involvements which are to be executed 
at local (agro-ecosystem, community) level, while others require regional and nationwide 
governance. There are also activities, which are to be coordinated at international (regional, 
European, worldwide) level due to strong necessity for trans-border actions (needs for 
cooperation in natural resources management, prevention of ecosystem disturbances, 
exploration of economies of scale/scale, governing spill-overs)40 or consistent (national, local) 
government failures. Frequently effective management of many agro-ecosystem problems 
(risks) requires multilevel governance with combined actions at various levels involving 
diverse range of actors and geographical scales. 
Public (regulatory, provision, inspecting) modes must have built special mechanisms for 
increasing competency (decrease bounded rationality, powerlessness) of bureaucrats, 
beneficiaries, interests groups and public at large as well as restricting possible opportunism 
(cheating, interlinking, abuse of power, corruption) of public officers and other stakeholders. 
That could be made by training, introducing new communication technologies, increasing 
transparency (independent assessment, audit), and involving experts, beneficiaries, and 
interests groups in management of public modes at all levels. Furthermore, applying “market 
like” mechanisms (competition, auctions) in public projects design, selection and 
implementation would significantly increase incentives and decrease overall costs.  
Principally, pure public organization should be used as last resort when all other modes 
do not work effectively (Williamson). “In-house” public organization has higher (direct, 
indirect) costs for setting up, running, controlling, reorganization, liquidation. What is more, 
unlike market and private forms there is not automatic mechanism (competition) for sorting 
out less effective modes41. Here public “decision making” is required which is associated 
with high costs and time, and often influenced by strong private interests (power of lobbying 
groups, policy makers and associates, employed bureaucrats) rather than efficiency. Along 
with development of general institutional environment (“The Rule of Law”) and measurement, 
communication etc. technologies, efficiency of pro-market modes (regulation, information, 
recommendation) and contract forms would get bigger advantages over internal less flexible 
public arrangements (Bachev, 2007).  
Usually hybrid modes (public-private partnership) are much more efficient than pure 
public forms given coordination, incentives, and control advantages. Involvement of farmers, 
beneficiaries and interest groups increase efficiency - decrease asymmetry of information, 
restrict opportunisms, increase incentives for private costs-sharing, reduce management costs. 
For instance, hybrid mode would be appropriate for carrying out supply of environment, 
biodiversity, landscape, and heritage preservation service by farmers. That is determined by 
farmers information superiority, interlinks of activity with farming production (economy of 
scope), high assets specificity to farm (farmers competence, investment’s cite-specificity to 
farm, land, ecosystem), spatial interdependency (need for farmers cooperation at ecosystem 
or wider scale), and origin of negative externalities. Furthermore, enforcement of most 
environmental, biodiversity etc. standards is often very difficult or impossible. In all these 
cases, stimulating and supporting (assisting, training, funding) private voluntary actions are 
much more effective then mandatory public modes in terms of incentive, coordination, 
enforcement, disputing costs (Bachev, 2004).   
                                                 
40 e.g. in 2009 Bulgarian authority started fox vaccination as part of EU fox protection initiative. 
41 It is not rare to see highly inefficient but “sustainable“ public organizations around globe. 
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Comparative analysis let us improve design of new forms of public intervention 
according to specific (natural, market, institutional) conditions of particular agro-ecosystem42 
and participating actors (decision-makers, implementers, beneficiaries, and interest groups). 
What is more, we could predict likely cases of new public (local, national, international) 
failures due to impossibility to mobilize political support and necessary resources or 
ineffective implementation of otherwise “good” policies. Since public failure is feasible 
option its timely detection permits foreseeing persistence (rising) of certain environmental 
problems and conflicts, and informing (local, international) community about associated risks.    
 
Bulgarian experiences in Agro-ecosystem service governance 
 
Post-communist transformation in Bulgaria has been associated with significant 
challenges for agro-ecosystems such as degradation and contamination of farmland, 
pollution of surface and ground waters, loss of biodiversity, significant greenhouse gas 
emissions etc. (Bachev, 2008). Badly defined and enforced environmental rights; 
prolonged process of privatization; domination of farming structures with no incentives 
for long-term investment; high uncertainty and asset specificity combined with low 
frequency and appropriability of eco-transactions; ineffective forms of public intervention 
- all they are responsible for poor environmental management. EU integration and 
implementation of common (agricultural, environmental, regional) policies gives new 
opportunities to improve eco-management and services of agro-ecosystems in the country. 
We will analyze structure, efficiency and prospects of governance of agro-ecosystem 
services in Zapadna Stara Planina (ZSP) – a mountainous region in North-West Bulgaria 
(Map 1). Specific agro-ecosystems services and their governance are significantly affected 
by recent development. 
 
 
 
Map 1: Zapadna Stara Planina ecosystem in Bulgaria          Map 2: Natura 2000 Habitat directive sites (light  
                                                                                                green) and Bird directive sites (dark green)  
 
Agro-ecosystems in ZSP are part of unique ecosystem of ZSP43 and provide a wide 
range of specific services (Figure 6). Great number of agents from and outside region 
                                                 
42 Institutions can rarely be “imported“ but must be designed for specific conditions of different 
ecosystems, communities, regions, countries. 
43 ZSP region covers area of 4043 km2 (2099 km2 in Bulgaria and 1944 km2 in Serbia) out of which 
60% is forests and rest is farmland (Grigorova and Kazakova). 
 17
benefit from and affect services of these ago-ecosystems – owners44, farmers, residents, 
businesses, visitors, consumers, scientists and interest groups.  
 
Figure 6: Services of Agro-ecosystems in Zapadna Stara Planina 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approximately 70% of farmland in ZSP comprises meadows and pastures (MAF). They 
provide abandon feed for farm and household animals, and create good conditions for 
development of grazing livestock (sheep, goats, cattle, buffalos, horses) and domestic animals 
(poultry, rabbits, pigs). In addition, there are plenty of wild flowers and herbs which favor 
bees keeping and herbal honey production as well as collection of natural medical plants. 
Furthermore, a wide range of farm products are produced in this environment used for 
provisioning of local population and marketing. Some of local farm-based produces are well-
known for their quality, unique taste and original character (strawberry, raspberry, blackberry, 
berry jams, herb honey, sheep yogurt and cheese, lamb meat, wool, fur, prune, plum brandy) 
and marketed at regional, national and international markets. Simultaneously, they favor 
development of related productions and services being important income source for local 
populations – (jam, dairy, brandy, leather) processing, dying wool, weaving and crafts making, 
on-farm and direct marketing, agro-tourism.  
What is more, for many local and not-permanent residents interactions with agro-
ecosystems are favorite mode of recreation (part-time or hobby farming, short or longer term 
visits) or life style (weekend/summer houses). Moreover, local traditions and ethnic culture of 
Torlaks and Karakachans are closely related to agro-ecosystems and farming system – 
specific agricultural and related products (e.g. Chiprovtsi hand-made carpets), crop verities 
and animal breeds, production methods and technologies, festivals, cuisine, crafts. Besides, 
unique shape and quality of landscape is a critical feature of agro-ecosystems dominating by 
natural or semi-natural high mountain pastures, riparian meadows, stony and rocky terrains. 
All these attract many visitors from the region, country and abroad. 
Next, agro-ecosystems contribute significantly for maintaining (improving) soil quality - 
vegetation cover reducing soil loss and degradation and promoting water infiltration. 
                                                 
44 50% of pollution in ZSP own agricultural lands (Grigorova and Kazakova). 
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Furthermore, carbon sequestration is important service of grasslands, berry bushes, orchards 
and vineyards storing considerable amount of CO2 stock. 
Agro-ecosystems also provide combined services with larger ecosystem of ZSP. Great 
variety of wild fruits, herbs, chestnuts, mushrooms, birds, animals and fish are available and 
picked up or hunted by local population and visitors. What is more, some of them are 
commercially gathered for processing and sells bringing additional incomes for around 20% 
of population (Grigorova and Kazakova). 
Ecosystem ZSP is a source of clean mountain and mineral water used by farmers (for 
animals, irrigation), residents (for drinking, household needs), businesses (for inputs, bottling) 
and health centers (for balneotherapy) in the region and neighboring areas. Besides, it purifies 
water and air and regulate climate making region one of favorite destination for tourism, 
recreation and treatment45. Moreover, some of country’s most popular natural wonders like 
Rocks of Belogradchik46, Iskar Gorge, and number of picks, waterfalls and caves are located 
in ZSP enhancing cultural services of ecosystem.  
Furthermore, territory of ZSP is with high ornithological and botanical importance 
designated as Pan-European network NATURA 2000 site (Map 2). Maintaining this rich 
biodiversity is a great service of ecosystem ZSP. For instance, in its flora there are more than 
2000 species of higher plants (among which 12 Bulgarian and 79 Balkan endemics47) while 
its fauna comprise more than 180 bird species, more than 50 species of mammals, 26 species 
of amphibians and reptiles, and many butterfly species of conservation importance (Grigorova 
and Kazakova). All these increase educational and scientific services of this unique ecosystem 
as well. 
Various market, private and public modes are used for governing of agro-ecosystem 
services in ZSP (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Modes of governance of agro-ecosystem services in Zapadna Stara Planina 
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45 Well-known mountainous resorts Berkovitza, Varshetz, Izketz are located in ZSP. 
46 It is nominated to be one of New 7 Natural Wonders of the World. 
47 Besides, hill “Vrashka Chuka” is worlds only place of Eranthis bulgaricus. 
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Post-communist reforms transferred entire agrarian activity from large public farms into 
market and private governance (Bachev, 2006). Private management and market adjustments 
have been associated with domination of small-scale and subsistence holdings (Table 1), 
sharp decline in crop and livestock (but goat) productions48 and general desintensification of 
activity49. Private ownership introduced better incentives for environmental stewardship while 
small operational size led to overcoming certain problems of large public enterprises from the 
past50 and revived some traditional (more sustainable) technologies, varieties and products. 
By-product from this market and private “governance” has been overall improvement of agro-
ecosystems services in ZSP. Farm and related productions have got “organic” character 
obtaining good reputation for products with high quality and safety. Region has become 
attractive destination for many local and foreign tourists willing to experience genuine nature, 
and traditional cuisine and lifestyle.  
 
Table 1: Major characteristics of farms in Zapadna Stara Planina* 
 
Indicator Value Indicator Value 
Number of farms 12151 Share of farms with cattle (%) 17,2 
Average UAA (ha) 0,997 Average cattle per farm 2,9 
Share of arable land (%) 33,6 Share of farms with sheep (%) 51,1 
Share of cereals (%) 18,4 Average sheep per farm 5,5 
Share of horticulture (%) 4,3 Share of farms with goats (%) 62,7 
Share of grassland (%) 58,7 Average goats per farm 2,6 
Share of permanent crops (%) 4,9 Share of farms with pigs (%) 47,2 
Share of farms with bees (%) 6,3 Average pigs per farm 1,5 
Average bees colonies per farm 7,1 Share of farms with poultry (%) 69,0 
  Average poultry per farm  14,2 
* Berkovitsa, Varshets, Georgi Damyanovo, Chiprovtsi, Belogradchik, Chuprene, Godech, Svoge municipalities 
Source: MAF  
 
Market-driven organic production has emerged in recent years but it is restricted to few 
farms, processors and traders. Currently organic mode covers 3% of UAA, several hundreds 
livestock and hives, insignificant gathering area for wild fruits and herbs (MAF). Country 
biggest producers of organic raspberries and bee honey are located in ZSP. Organic form has 
been introduced by business entrepreneurs who managed to organize and fund this new 
venture arranging independent certification51 and marketing highly specific output. However, 
internal market for organic and eco-products is still undeveloped because of higher prices and 
limited consumer confidence in authenticity52.  
Number of effective private modes have also evolved and govern relations between 
farmers, processors, food stores, and consumers. High specificity and capacity dependency 
are widely safeguarded by cooperation (services, processing), long-term contracts (marketing 
of milk and organic berries), interlinked organization (milk marketing against free provision 
of cooling vanes and credit), and compete integration (diversification of farming into 
processing, agro-tourism). Often non-agrarian agent (processor, food store, restaurant chain, 
                                                 
48 Number of cattle, pigs, sheep and poultry dropped by 61%, 77%, 81% and 53% accordingly while 
potatoes, wheat, vegetables and Alfalfa hay productions shrunk by 33%, 50%, and 75% (NSI). 
49 Now per ha application of fertilizers and pesticides represents 22% and 31% of 1989 levels (MAF). 
50  lost natural landscape and biodiversity, nitrate and pesticide contamination, huge manure 
concentration, uncontrolled erosion, significant green gas emissions. 
51 Most certification is done by foreign bodies since no local institutions existed until recently. 
52 Fake labeling is reported daily by Organization for Consumer Protection. 
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exporter) driven by market or institutional demand initiates, funds, and integrates eco-farming. 
That is the case with Danon baying milk from big dairy farms (and enforcing safety, quality, 
environmental and animal welfare standards), a Japanese investors financing organic apiaries 
and exporting bio-honey, a leading restaurant chain integrating dairy farming and processing.  
Cooperatives have been typical mode having great potential to organize highly specific to 
members transactions (supply of critical inputs and services, processing, marketing), explore 
economies of scale and scope, mediate relations between landowners and users, adapt to 
requirements of banks and public institutions. Moreover, they implement better environmental 
strategies preserving soil fertility and observing crop-rotation and agro-techniques 
requirements (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: Share of farms implementing different strategies (%) 
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          Source: Survey data, 2008 
 
Market and private voluntary, non-for profit or for-profit forms contribute significantly 
to improvement of eco-governance but their scope is usually restricted to portion of agro-
ecosystems (services). For instance, a fifth of agricultural lands have been abandoned which 
caused uncontrolled “development” of species allowing expansion of some and suppressing 
others. Furthermore, part of permanent natural and semi-natural meadows have been left 
under-grazed or under-mowed, and intrusion of shrubs and trees into grassland took places 
putting pressure on priority species (like Souslik) and related chain (Marbled Polecat) 
(Grigorova and Kazakova). Some of fertile semi-natural grasslands have been converted to 
cultivation (crops, berries, vineyards, orchards) which caused irreversible disappearance of 
plant species diversity. Meanwhile, communal and private pastures close to settlements have 
been degraded by unsustainable use (over-grazing). In addition, reckless collection of certain 
wild plants (berries, herbs, flowers) and animals (snail, snakes) have led to destruction of 
natural habitats. Besides, erosion has been major factor for land degradation as a result of 
inappropriate agro-techniques, deficiency of anti-erosion measures, and uncontrolled 
deforestation (EEA). Damages are further enhanced by dominating negative rate of fertilizer 
compensation of N, P and K intakes and unbalance application of nutrient components (MAF). 
In addition, lack of effective manure storage capacities in most farms53, and modern sewer 
and garbage collection systems in rural areas bring about air, soil and water pollution, and 
affect beauty of scenery.  
What is more, most cooperatives have shown serious disadvantages (ineffective 
management, low incentives for long-term investment, small adaptability to members and 
market needs) and 60% of them have gone bankrupt after 2000. Similarly, majority of dairy 
farms and processors have failed to adapt to tough EU (safety, hygiene, environment, animal 
                                                 
53 0,1% of livestock farms possess safe manure-pile sites, around 81% use primitive dunghills, and rest 
have no facilities at all (MAF). 
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welfare) standard and had to cease commercial activity. Finally, private interests of particular 
individuals (groups) have harmed legitimate public rights to ecosystem services due to 
restricting access, conversion of proper use (farm/forest land into construction), or escaping 
public order on natural resource management54.  
Until 2007 EU accession, country’s environmental and other laws, programs and 
standards were harmonized with immense Community Acquis. There have appeared new 
opportunities to get public support for divers private and collective activities related to agro-
ecosystem services. For instance 2007-2013 National Plan for Agricultural and Rural 
Development (NPARD) provides significant funding for area-based and agro-environmental 
payments (organic farming, management of agricultural lands with high natural value, 
traditional livestock, protection of soils and water, and preservation of landshaft features55); 
modernization of farms, processing and marketing; diversification of activity; infrastructural 
development; keeping traditions; training etc. Moreover, requirement for “cross-compliance” 
(with modern quality, safety, environmental, animal welfare etc. standards56) for receiving 
public support is introduced. Funding for projects related to eco-system services is also 
available from Fund LIFE+ and Operational Programs “Environment”, “Fishery and 
Aquaculture” and “Regional Development”.  
However, implementation of new public order is not effective because of lack of agents 
awareness and experience, inadequate administrative capacity, and mismanagement (Bachev, 
2008). For instance, SAPARD57 measure “Agro-ecology” was not approved until September 
2006 and few projects were actually funded. What is more, in 2008 European Commission 
suspended SAPARD because of corruption, and considerable funding lost. Furthermore, due 
to restricting criteria58, complicated procedures, and high transacting costs, majority of farms 
(small-scale and subsistent holdings) have not been able to participate in diverse support 
schemes. For example, less than 5% of all farms from ZSP, comprising 18% of grasslands and 
8% of arable land, are registered in Land Parcels Identification System (indicating land 
eligible for CAP support). From SAPARD agro-ecological measures benefited less than 100 
farms from ZSP while other supports went predominately to large farms and most developed 
regions (MAF). Up-to-date Programs “Environment” funded no biodiversity projects (MWE). 
In some cases, enforcement of environmental standards is difficult since costs for detection of 
offenders are high. For instance, forbidden practice of burning of (stubble) fields is 
widespread causing deterioration of soil quality, extermination of micro-flora and habitats, 
contribution to green-house emissions, multiplying forests fires, and diminishing visibility 
(EEA). Likewise, requirement for minimum-maximum number of animals on pastures is very 
difficult to enforce (only 5 % of beneficiaries subject to inspection).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Agro-ecosystem services have always been an important factor for human welfare. Their 
specific character and evolution depends both on “Rule of nature” and development of society 
(progress in demand and technologies, “rules of the game”). Effective supply of agro-
ecosystem services is eventually determined by the efficiency of specific governance which 
(is to) includes preset formal and informal rules (institutions environment), voluntary 
                                                 
54 Lobbying efforts led to reduction in numbers and area of initially identified sites for NATURA 2000. 
55 5 year contracts with payments according to type of activity and farm size. 
56 For receiving direct payments land must be kept in “good agronomic and ecological condition”. 
57 EU Special Assistance Program for Agriculture and Rural Development (2000-2006). 
58 For direct and agro-ecological payments minimum farm size is 1 ha (permanent crops 0,5 ha) and 
0,5 ha as 0,1 ha parcel size also applies (landless livestock holdings are not eligible). NPARD does not 
provide support for restoration of abandoned farmland and organic livestock (but forage) production.   
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initiatives, “invisible hand of market”, negotiated or set by “manager’s hand” private order, 
collective actions (cooperation, codes of behavior), public modes (public order, support, 
provision), and hybrid organizations (trilateral and multilateral modes). In order to improve 
eco-behavior of individuals we have to assess comparative efficiency of alternative modes of 
governance of agro-ecosystem services - their potential to protect interests and minimize costs 
of transacting of beneficiaries, contributors, destructors etc. Analyses of institutional and 
transaction structure let us identify market, private and public “failures” and needs for (new) 
public intervention as well as evaluate efficiency of feasible modes for public involvement 
(assistance, regulations, property rights modernization) and predict likely failures in agro-
ecosystem services.  
Post-communist transition and EU integration has brought about significant changes in 
the state and governance of agro-ecosystems services in Bulgaria. Newly evolved market, 
private and public governance has led to significant improvement of part of agro-ecosystems 
services in mountainous ZSP introducing modern eco-standards and public support, 
enhancing environmental stewardship, desintensifying production, recovering landscape and 
traditional productions, diversifying quality, products, and services. At the same time, novel 
governance is associated with some new challenges such as unsustainable exploitation, lost 
biodiversity, land degradation, water and air contamination. What is more, implementation of 
EU common policies would have no desired impact on agro-ecosystem services unless special 
measures are taken to improve management of public programs, and extend public support to 
dominating small-scale and subsistence farms. 
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